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Synopsis

The Supreme Court recently observed that once a limitation prescribed for instituting a cause of action expires and even if limitation is not set up as a defence, it obliges the court to dismiss the suit as barred by limitation.

A bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and S V N Bhatti said Section 3 of the Limitation Act contemplates that every suit instituted after the period prescribed under the Act shall be dismissed even if limitation has not been set up as a defence.   

"The provision is of a mandatory nature and cannot be ignored by the courts even if not pleaded or argued by the defence. It is obligatory upon the court to dismiss the suit if it is, on the face of it, barred by limitation. The provision has been enacted for public good and to give quietus to a remedy after lapse of a particular period, as a matter of public policy, though without extinguishing the right in certain cases," the bench said.   

In the case at hand, the court noted, the plaintiff not only categorically stated that he acquired knowledge of the Will and the Codicil in the first week of November, 2014 but also that the cause of action for the suit first arose on February 04, 2014 and lastly on October 21, 2014. The suit was filed on November 21, 2017. As such on the own averments of the plaintiff, the suit was instituted beyond limitation attracting Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC.

Plaintiff- Hitesh P Sanghvi instituted a suit in the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, against four persons including Smt Harshaben Vijay Mehta, Smt Nikhila Divyang Mehta, Smt Ami Rajesh Parikh and Nilav Divyang Mehta as defendants seeking direction from the court to declare the Will of February 04, 2014 and the Codicil of September 20, 2014 executed by his late father Pramod Kesurdas Sanghavi and all consequential actions thereof to be null and void as also for grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from entering into any transaction in furtherance of the aforesaid Will and Codicil. 

The city court held that the plaintiff stated that he had come to know of the Will and the Codicil in the first week of November, 2014, in view of Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit ought to have been filed within three years when the right to sue first accrued. Since the suit was not filed within three years i.e., by the first week of November, 2017, it was patently barred by limitation.    

The Gujarat High Court, however, by the impugned judgment and order of February 08, 2024 held that the parties ought to have been permitted to lead evidence on the point of limitation and that the plaint was not liable to be rejected in part, as apart from seeking declaration of the Will and the Codicil to be null and void, there were other reliefs which were sought in the plaint.   

Examining the challenge, the apex court held that the submission that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and that it cannot be decided without allowing the party to lead evidence was of no substance. 

In the present case, the court noted that the suit was admittedly instituted on November 21, 2017, whereas according to the plaint averments, the cause of action first arose on February 04, 2014. Even assuming that the cause of action last arose in the first week of November, 2014, the suit ought to have been filed by November 07, 2017. The suit was filed on November 21, 2017. It was ex-facie barred by limitation for which, no evidence was required to be adduced by the parties. The issue is purely an issue of fact and in the admitted facts as per the plaint, allegations stand concluded for which no evidence is needed, the bench said.

The plaintiff raised the contention that he acquired knowledge of the Will and Codicil in the first week of November, 2014, but that was not a complete knowledge as probably he could have read the same subsequently. 

In dealing with the submission, the bench pointed out the appellate court distinguished between “having knowledge” and “full knowledge” to hold that the suit was not barred by limitation as the limitation would reckon from the date of full knowledge. 

"It is a complete fallacy to make any distinction between “knowledge” and “full knowledge”," the bench said.

First of all, the limitation has to run from the date when the cause of action first accrued and not any subsequent date for the cause of action. According to the plaintiff himself, the cause of action for the suit had arisen much earlier. Secondly, the plaintiff had not pleaded any date on which he acquired complete knowledge and that such argument was only an afterthought and appeared to be a simple creation of the first appellate court, the bench said.   

In the case, the first appellate court had ruled that in the suit, the plaintiff had claimed different reliefs and even if the plaint was barred by limitation in respect of one of the reliefs, it could not be rejected in toto.

"This submission is also without substance as upon the plain reading of the prayers made in the plaint, it is apparent that the primary relief claimed therein is to declare the Will and the Codicil to be null and void and also all subsequent proceedings thereto. In addition to it, the plaintiff has claimed permanent injunction. The other reliefs are dependent upon the first relief and cannot be granted until and unless the plaintiff succeeds in the first relief. Therefore, once the plaint or the suit in respect of the main relief stands barred by time, the other ancillary relief claimed therein also falls down," the bench said.

Admittedly, the court pointed out, a suit for declaration has to be governed by Part III of the Schedule contained in the Act. Part III of the Schedule provides for the limitation for filing suits relating to declarations. Article 56 deals with declaration with regard to the forgery of an instrument issued or registered and Article 57 relates to declaration in respect to adoption.

The relief of declaration claimed in the suit at hand does not fall under Articles 56 and 57 and, therefore, by necessary implication, Article 58 would stand attracted, which provides for a limitation period of three years to obtain any other declaration other than that mentioned under Articles 56 and 57. It provides that for such a declaration, the limitation is three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues, the court said.

The use of the words “when the right to sue first accrues” as mentioned in Article 58 is very relevant and important. It categorically provides that the limitation of three years has to be counted from the date when the right to sue first accrues, it added.  

According to the plaintiff’s own averments the suit had to be brought within time of three years either from the commencement of the cause of action on February 04, 2014 or lastly on October 21, 2014 when his father died or at best when he acquired knowledge of the Will and the Codicil i.e., the first week of November, 2014.

There is no dispute to the fact that the limitation for filing of the suit falls under Article 58 of the Schedule to the Act wherein the limitation prescribed is three years. It may be pertinent to note that the limitation of three years is from the date when the cause of action first arose. So, according to the plaintiff’s case, the cause of action first arose on February 04, 2014 and, therefore, the limitation would end on February 04, 2017, the bench said.

However, even if the limitation is calculated from the date of knowledge of the Will and/or the Codicil, it would run from the first week of November, 2014, and would end in the first week of November, 2017. The suit admittedly was instituted on November 21, 2017; much beyond the first week of November, 2017 and as such is apparently barred by limitation, for which neither any defence is required to be looked into nor any evidence in support is needed to be adduced, the bench said.  

The bench held, "We are of the opinion that the High Court manifestly erred in law in passing the impugned judgment and order dated 08.02.2024, reversing the judgment and order dated 23.10.2018 of the court of first instance rejecting the plaint of the plaintiff in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC".

The court set aside the judgment and order of the high court and restored that of the trial court. The court held that the plaint stood rejected as barred by limitation under Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC. 

Case Title: Nikhila Divyang Mehta & Anr Vs Hitesh P Singhvi & Ors