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Synopsis

The Supreme Court recently held that mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case.

"An offence under Section 375 IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations," a bench of Justices B V Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma said.  

Court discharged a man (the appellant), who entered into a relationship with a woman, a mother of two children, in 2016 on return from Canada, and allegedly forced her to take a divorce from her husband.

The sessions court had discharged the appellant for offences under Sections 376 and 506 IPC, arising out of an FIR lodged on June 05, 2021, registered at PS Sagarpur, Delhi. However, the high court set aside the trial court's order, forcing the appellant to approach the apex court.

The court referred to the ratio in the case of Naim Ahmed Vs State (NCT) of Delhi (2023) whereby the court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly, the prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual relationship with the accused, upon an assurance to marry. The prosecutrix, who was herself a married woman having three children, had continued to have such a relationship with the accused , at least for about five years till she gave the complaint. 

"The decision in Naim Ahmed is squarely applicable to the conspectus of the present case. It has been time and again settled by this court, that the mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case," the bench said.

The FIR was registered at the behest of the complainant, alleging that the appellant had established physical relations with her, with the promise to marry her, and take care of her two children. The appellant was known to the woman since 2011, prior to their respective marriages; however, their love rekindled in 2016, once their matrimonial lives became unsettled.  

On a bare perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet, the bench said it emerged that the physical relationship between the appellant and the woman was consensual from the very beginning and could not be said to be against the will or without her consent. 

"Even if her case is accepted, there is no material on record to show that there was any dishonest inducement, or incitement on part of the appellant. There is also no material on record, to establish an offence of criminal intimidation under section 506 IPC against him. In-fact, it is apparent from his conduct, that he was acting in furtherance of the promise to marry," the bench said. 

The court pointed out that it was the own observation of the high court, that the appellant had made a promise to marry the woman and was acting accordingly. The Mangalsutra being prepared with the initials of the name of the complainant did reflect his intention and promise to marry. However, in the event of a fall-out or split between the parties, it could not be said that the promise to marry was false, and the corresponding conduct dishonest, the bench said.   

It further said there was also no element of criminality that could be accrued to the appellant, insofar as it was the own case of the prosecutrix, that she was in a relationship with him, while being in a subsisting marriage. 

"It is also hard to believe that the prosecutrix could have sustained a physical relationship for a prolonged period of five years, while being in a subsisting marriage, and even subsequently obtaining divorce to sustain the relationship," the bench said.

The prolonged period of the relationship, during which the sexual relations continued between the parties, is sufficient to conclude that there was never an element of force or deceit in the relationship. The prosecutrix was thus, conscious and cognizant of the consequences of her actions, and had given her consent after an active and reasoned deliberation, the bench added.

The court found that there was sufficient material on record for the sessions court to exercise powers under section 227 CrPC, and discharge the appellant. 

The bench emphasised that it is trite law that at the time of framing of charge, a mini trial is not permissible and the trial court has to proceed with the material brought on record by the prosecution and determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged. 

A bare review of the FIR and the charge-sheet and material placed on record by the prosecution, would clarify that the ingredients of offences under Section 375/506 IPC are not established, the bench held.

"We also find that the High Court has undertaken an exhaustive analysis of the allegations in the FIR, and the chargesheet, while failing to consider that at the stage of framing of charges, the court must only adjudicate on the basis of material on record," the bench said.

The bench emphasised that it is trite law that the scope of interference and exercise of revisional jurisdiction is extremely limited and should be exercised very sparingly, specifically in instances, where the decision under challenge is grossly erroneous, or there is non compliance of the provisions of law, or the finding recorded by the trial court is based on no evidence, or material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely by framing the charge. 

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the high court on January 03, 2024. It upheld the sessions court's order of June 8, 2023, and terminated the proceedings arising out of the FIR.

Case Title: Jaspal Singh Kaural Vs The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr