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Synopsis

The Supreme Court on April 16, 2025 observed that a decision rendered by it, be it at the stage of special leave petition or post-grant of leave while exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, cannot be assailed directly or collaterally under Article 32 of the Constitution. 

A bench of Justices Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta, and Ujjal Bhuyan said the remedy of an aggrieved litigant is to file for review. 

"If the grievance persists even thereafter, he may invoke the curative jurisdiction subject to compliance of the requirements of such jurisdiction. But certainly it is not open for him to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking the same relief," the bench said.

The apex court dismissed a petition filed by Satish Chander Sharma and others under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Petitioners were retired officers of the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation Limited. They were aggrieved by denial of pensionary benefits to them in terms of the Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999 discontinued by the notification of December 02, 2004, which though carved out an exception for those who had opted for the scheme and had superannuated before December 02, 2004.

The issue was earlier raised by a group of petitioners before the Himachal Pradesh High Court by filing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, the lead case being P D Nanda Vs State of HP in 2009. The high court had allowed the writ petitions in 2013 by directing the State to provide pension to the retired employees of the corporation. This decision was, however, reversed by a two-judge bench of the top court in State of H P Vs Rajesh Chander Sood (2016).

Since the correctness of the court’s judgment in Rajesh Chander Sood was questioned, the Chief Justice of India was requested to place the matter before a three-judge bench.

Having heard the counsel, the bench pointed out that the court rejected the contention of the employees that they should be treated similarly like government employees. The claim for parity with government employees was held to be wholly misconceived. Thereafter, the court held that the State Government had the competence to repeal the 1999 Scheme. By doing so, the State Government had not curtailed the right of the employees to receive pension; they would continue to receive pension under the erstwhile pension scheme but would not get the additional benefits under the 1999 Scheme, it pointed out.

With regard to the contention that the judgment in Rajesh Chander Sood was per incuriam, the bench said, "We are unable to hold so". 

The bench noted the court had given elaborate reasons while allowing the civil appeal of the State, thereby reversing the judgment of the high c;ourt, including upholding the cut-off date of December 02, 2004. 

"Merely because according to the petitioners the reasons given in the judgment while accepting the stand of the State may not be in sync with previous decisions, it cannot be said to be a judgment rendered per incuriam. The concept of per incuriam is too well settled to warrant a detailed analysis here. The judgment rendered in Rajesh Chandra Sood by no stretch can be said to have ignored any binding precedent. Hence, the same cannot be said to be a judgment rendered per incuriam," the bench said.

The court also said the contentions that were being raised now were all advanced before the court in Rajesh Chander Sood and those were all adjudicated. 

"It is not open for the petitioners to once again seek the same reliefs as was sought in the earlier round of litigation which were negatived by this court. Therefore, there cannot be any challenge either directly or collaterally to the decision of this Court in Rajesh Chander Sood in a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution," the court held.

The bench pointed out in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs State of Maharashtra (1967), a nine-judge bench of the court declared that it was impossible to accept the argument of the petitioners that judicial orders passed by the high courts in or in relation to proceedings pending before them were amenable to be corrected by the top court under Article 32 of the Constitution.

In Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs Ashok Hurra (2002), this court held that to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriage of justice, this court may reconsider its judgment in exercise of its inherent power. For that, this court provided for a curative jurisdiction post dismissal of review petition by filing curative petition. In Omprakash Verma Vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2010) reiterated the well-settled principle that a judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be collaterally challenged on the ground that certain points had not been considered, the bench highlighted.   

Again, in the case of Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs Union of India (2011), this court held that a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution assailing the correctness of a decision of the Supreme Court on merits or seeking reconsideration is not maintainable, the bench said.

In Khoday Distilleries Ltd Vs Registrar General, Supreme Court of India (1996), it was held that the judgment and order of this court passed under Article 136 of the Constitution is not amenable to judicial review under Article 32 of the Constitution, it said.    

"Therefore, it is crystal clear that the present writ petition is thoroughly misconceived and is liable to be dismissed," the bench said, while emphasising and reiterating the principle of finality of an adjudication process. 

"Finality of a lis is a core facet of a sound judicial system. Litigation which had concluded or had reached finality cannot be reopened," the bench asserted.

The bench highlighted that a litigant who is aggrieved by a decision rendered by the apex court in a special leave petition or in a civil appeal arising therefrom can seek its review by invoking the review jurisdiction and thereafter through a curative petition. But such a decision cannot be assailed in a writ proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. 

"If this is permitted, then there will be no finality and no end to litigation. There will be chaos in the administration of justice," it said.  

In Green View Tea & Industries Vs Collector (2002), the court expressed the view that finality of an order of the Supreme Court should not lightly be unsettled, the bench stressed.

The bench finally said, "We are of the unhesitant view that the present writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is wholly misconceived. The decision of this court in Rajesh Chander Sood is clearly binding on the petitioners. That being the position, there is no merit in the writ petition which is accordingly dismissed".

Considering the fact that petitioners were retired employees and senior citizens, the court refrained from imposing any cost.

Case Title: Satish Chander Sharma Vs State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors